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为什么遭中国逮捕的两个迈克尔曾对其险境完全不知(观点)

Opinion: Canada's GSRP Flaws: A Crucial Factor in the Two Michaels' Ordeal
来源: 大中网/096.ca 南茜(Nancy Jin)

全球安全报告计划(GSRP)是加拿大全球事务部属下的一个提供加拿大官方外交报告的机构,该计划表面行动公开,与情报机构如英国军情六处(MI6)和美国中央情报局(CIA)等间谍机构有别。但尽管该计划所承担的角色和宗旨却往往与传统的间谍活动有很大重叠,与传统情报机构的界限模糊,给外国势力对加拿大政府及该计划官员采取报复行动提供可乘之机。GSRP的这一机构的特性及缺陷还会使其官员及其不享受外交豁免权的联系人无法正确评估其个人所身处的危险。

The Global Security Reporting Program (GSRP), managed by Global Affairs Canada, serves as a non-covet official diplomatic reporting initiative, with distinction from the covert operations typical of intelligence agencies like MI6 and the CIA. Despite these intentions, GSRP’s role and efforts highlight a notable degree of overlap with traditional intelligence gathering activities, blurring the lines and potentially provoking foreign retaliation against Canada and its operatives. This ambiguity has sometimes led GSRP personnel and their contacts, particularly those without diplomatic immunity, to underestimate the risks involved.

加拿大两个迈克尔的遭遇就是GSRP项目的这种固有的结构缺陷的最佳验证,而其起因缘由于科夫里格(Michael Kovrig) 曾在该项目中所任的外交官一职。2020年,中国拘留了加拿大的两个迈克尔,科夫里格和斯帕弗(Michael Spavor),中国的这一之举被广泛视为对加拿大逮捕华为首席执行官孟晚舟的报复。尽管科夫里格曾以加拿大外交官的身份与斯帕弗交往并严格遵守了外交官的操守规范,但两人似乎都对GSRP项目的结构弊端以及其给项目官员和其联系人所造成的风险缺乏足够的认识。

The vulnerabilities within the GSRP were starkly highlighted by the ordeal of the Two Michaels, a situation directly stemming from Michael Kovrig's association with the program. China's detention of Kovrig and Michael Spavor in2020 was widely interpreted as retaliation for Canada’s arrest of Huawei CEO Meng Wanzhou. Despite Kovrig adhering to the expected standards of a foreign diplomat in his dealings with Spavor, both were seemingly caught off-guard by the GSRP's operational ambiguities and the inherent risks.

GSRP与情报工作的这种角色重叠引起了中国政府的警觉,中国政府将任何与该计划有关的人士都置于其密切监视之中。根据诉讼文件,斯帕弗当时并不知道曾任GSRP官员的科夫里格已被中国视为从事间谍活动,且他曾向科夫里格所提供的信息会被作为情报传递给加国政府及五眼联盟。斯帕弗因间谍罪在中国被判刑11年,并在监狱中接受长时间审讯,他被迫服用药物、长时间坐罚,并受到了将被处决的威胁。斯帕弗的噩梦遭遇与凯文和朱莉娅·加勒特(Kevin and Julia Garratt)遭遇相似,这对加拿大夫妇也是因凯文.加勒特在毫无戒备的情况下于2014年与一名GSRP官员会面后在中国被捕。

The GSRP's resemblance to intelligence work has raised concerns with countries like China, putting anyone connected to the program under scrutiny. Unbeknownst to Spavor, his discussions with Kovrig, perceived by China as espionage due to Kovrig's GSRP involvement, were allegedly relayed as intelligence to the Canadian government and its Five Eyes alliance. Spavor's eventual conviction on espionage charges, coupled with his detention characterized by extreme mistreatment, underscores the dire consequences stemming from these ambiguities. A similar fate befell Kevin and Julia Garratt, a Canadian couple arrested in China in 2014 after their unwitting interaction with a GSRP officer.

而科夫里格本人所经历的磨难更清楚地展现出GSRP的结构缺陷和防范漏洞。负责监督政府机构的民间监督组织国家安全和情报审查机构(NSIRA)的最新报告指出,前GSRP官员如果在没有外交豁免权的情况下重返工作国,则会面临因其任职期间行为而遭到当地国家起诉的重大安全风险。低估了这一风险的科夫里格在没有外交豁免身份的情况下返回中国后被捕,并在中国监狱中度过一千多天,期间遭受的折磨不亚于GSRP的被联系人斯帕弗和加勒特。然而,科夫里格的麻烦并非随从被中国监狱释放而消失,在加拿大他遭到法律诉讼,并被人怀疑为间谍。

The profound impact of the GSRP's flawed structure and safety protocols was further underscored by Kovrig's distressing experience. The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) reported that former GSRP officers face significant risks upon returning to the host country without diplomatic immunity. Kovrig, underestimating these dangers, faced over a thousand days of detention under harsh conditions similar to those endured by others linked to the GSRP. Even following his release, Kovrig has encountered legal challenges and remains shrouded in suspicion, being perceived as involved in espionage.

GSRP这种固有的,在间谍角色和外交职责之间模糊不清的界限不仅危及了加拿大外交官的人身安全和信誉,还助长了加国对立国的气焰。上述GSRP官员及其被联系人的这些危险经历突显出在该项目的透明度和安全措施方面进行彻底改革的必要性。这种战略性的改革不仅仅是为了保护项目官员的安全,还是为了确保外交官能坦然正直地履行其保卫家安全的职责,从而避免这类造成严重外交后果的事件的再度发生。

The indistinct boundaries within the GSRP, blurring espionage and diplomatic reporting, have not only jeopardized the safety and credibility of Canadian diplomats but also played into the hands of adversaries. The significant challenges endured by GSRP officers and their contacts highlight the urgent need for transparent and robust reforms. Establishing an official clandestine foreign intelligence service in Canada, with clear and precise missions, is paramount. The strategic shift is not merely about protecting individuals; it's about ensuring Canada's diplomatic efforts and national security are conducted with integrity, foresight, and accountability, thereby preventing future incidents that could lead to severe diplomatic repercussions.

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